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Events of the past two years are a reminder that crises 
are a recurring phenomenon with deep and often 
protracted impacts on labor markets. This paper examines 
the challenges inherent in crafting policy responses, 
with particular attention to developing countries. It 
focuses on the potential tradeoffs between offsetting 
adverse short-term impacts and preserving incentives 
for economic recovery and future growth, and between 
protecting the most vulnerable and compensating those 
most immediately impacted. It also highlights how 
policymakers’ room for maneuver is constrained in crisis 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is part 
of a larger effort in the unit to enhance employment opportunities in developing countries and to mitigate the negative 
impact of economic shocks on household welfare and long-term growth. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at ppaci@worldbank.org.  
times by deteriorating fiscal space, limited institutional 
capacity, and mounting political pressures. Based on 
empirical evidence from previous crises, the paper asserts 
that taking a myopic and reactive approach may be costly 
and counterproductive. Instead, it advocates a more 
comprehensive approach, designed to build institutions 
—such as automatic stabilizers and safety nets—that 
can deliver a coordinated and coherent policy package. 
This approach will make crises catalysts for institutional 
changes and long-run growth. 
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 Although it is too early to make a complete and accurate diagnosis of the causes and impact 
of the recent crises on the global economy, it is clear that the capacity of policymakers to anticipate 
shocks, monitor their impact and formulate timely and effective policy responses has been fairly 
limited. Since the labor market is a prime channels through which shocks are transmitted to 
households, the especially weak ability of governments to foresee, monitor and offset adverse labor 
market impacts is an important concern. This is especially relevant for developing countries, since 
they are more vulnerable to volatility and because labor is the only asset of the majority of the 
population in most of these countries (Lustig and Walton 1998; Marquez 2000). Moreover, the 
recovery of the labor market after a crisis tends to be slow; in the aftermath of a crisis, aggregate 
indicators such as GDP growth sometimes obscure protracted pain in the labor market (Agenor 
2008; Reinhardt and Rogoff 2008).  
Economic crises thus confront policymakers with the need to act quickly to protect 
employment and earnings.  In combating crises they have to tackle potential tradeoffs: between 
minimizing short-term job losses as well as declines in earnings and catalyzing long-term growth; 
and between protecting those most vulnerable and those most impacted.  The costs of choosing the 
wrong policy package are high, since inappropriate policies might exacerbate, rather than attenuate 
crises. Moreover, policymakers’ room for maneuver is constrained by limited fiscal space, the 
prevailing policy regime and political economy conditions.  
By taking stock of the literature on the effectiveness of policies to protect employment and 
labor earnings during times of crises, this paper aims to help policymakers formulate appropriate 
country-tailored policy packages designed to reduce the vulnerability of employment and wages to 
economic shocks. The paper assesses potential tradeoffs between different policy options, highlights 
the importance of pre-existing institutions, and identifies which policies are likely to work best in 
different scenarios.  While it is clear that restoring (or preserving) macro-economic stability is a 
prerequisite for recovery from crisis, a comprehensive review of macroeconomic policies to cope 
with aggregate shocks is outside of the remit of this paper.   
The contribution of this paper is to review what we know about the effectiveness of policies 
enacted in crisis times and to assess such policies in the light of potential intertemporal tradeoffs 
between minimizing short-term losses and catalyzing long-run growth, and between protecting those 
most impacted and the most vulnerable. While there is a relatively large literature on the impact of 
active and passive labor market programs on labor market outcomes during less volatile economic 
times (see, for example, Betcherman and others 2004; Fretwell and others 1999; Auer and others 
2005), the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these policies in times of crisis is surprisingly 
limited and often yields ambiguous results. In addition, these policies have most often been analyzed 
in isolation and not as components of coherent packages to mitigate the impact of macroeconomic 
shocks. 3 
 
The paper is organized as follows; the next section discusses the difficult tradeoffs, which 
policymakers face during crises. Section 3 discusses the ingredients for effective policy packages, 
while section 4 reviews the evidence on various policies that have been applied in the past.  Section 
5 summarizes our key findings and concludes 
1. THORNY TRADEOFFS  
The main challenge for policymakers during crises is to design a policy package that can 
mitigate short-term negative impacts while maximizing, or at least not compromising, long-term 
growth prospects (Skoufias 2003; Lustig 2000; Holzmann and Jorgensen 2001). In addition, they 
may have to choose between protecting the poorest and most vulnerable and preserving the jobs 
and wages of those who are most directly impacted.  
1.1 Intertemporal Tradeoffs 
The presence of a policy tradeoff between mitigating the short-run impacts of an economic 
slowdown and facilitating the resumption of long-run growth will depend on the depth, length, and 
nature of the crisis. 
During short-lived downturns associated with the business cycle, the tradeoffs are typically 
limited. Well-designed countercyclical policies that preserve employment via temporarily stimulating 
output and labor demand will help minimize adverse short-term impacts and may also ensure 
maximum growth prospects by limiting any adverse long-term impact of shocks on household 
welfare, human capital accumulation and productive efficiency.  
However, most crises involve some degree of sectoral reallocation of employment and 
output. In this context, the tradeoffs become much more acute: countercyclical policies may not 
only be ineffective, they could prove counterproductive. This is because hampering adjustment by 
maintaining existing employment may deepen and prolong the crisis.  Indeed a  host of macro-
economic models dating back to Schumpeter (1939) point towards the potential benefits of 
recessions, arguing that they catalyze the process of creative destruction, by facilitating the efficient 
re-allocation of resources by cleansing out unproductive arrangements (see, for example, Caballero 
and Hammour 1994, 1996; Hall 1991).
 i  In such a setting, policy interventions should be designed to 
foster, rather than hamper, the required transformation. 
Any need to facilitate sectoral reallocation, however, does not obviate the need for some 
policy interventions to smooth the transition, as crises can be excessively punishing in the short-run, 
which in turn may undermine long-run growth prospects. To start with, crises are typically 
associated with excess churning of firms and workers (Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992); Davis and 
others 1996). Since the costs of separations are high (see, for example, Hall 1995), such churning is 
harmful. Crises also cause reductions in investments and innovation that could potentially flatten the 
economy’s long-run growth trajectory (see, for example, Ouyang forthcoming) as innovation is 
essential for productivity growth. 4 
 
In addition, crises may exacerbate frictions and market imperfections (see, for example, 
Barlevy 2002, 2003; Caballero and Hamour 2005).  Evidence indicates that worker reallocation and 
the quality of new jobs created are procyclical, rather than countercyclical (Bowlus 1993), suggesting 
that recessions slow the creation of productive matches. In addition, the negative association 
between firms’ productivity and the propensity to exit appears to be attenuated during crises 
(Casacuberta and Gandelman, 2009). One possible explanation for these findings is that crises 
exacerbate credit market imperfections; in Japan in the early 1990s, ailing firms were far more likely 
to receive additional credit than healthy ones, as troubled banks sought to avoid the realization of 
losses on their own balance sheets (Peek and Rosengren 2005).   
Experience from previous crises suggests that even short-lived shocks can have adverse 
permanent consequences. Being laid off during a recession can have a scarring effect; evidence from 
Finland suggest that those laid off during a recession suffer an earnings penalty that only gradually 
declines over time (Verho 2008). Crises can furthermore force households into actions with 
pernicious long-term consequences, which are often especially severe for women and children 
(Handa and King 1991; Alderman and others 2001).  These include depleting assets, reducing 
investments in physical and human capital as well as reducing essential consumption (see, for 
example, Bresciani and others 2002; Fallon and Lucas 2002; McKenzie 2002, McKenzie 2004, 
Manning 2000). Shocks can also have a lasting adverse effect on firms, as crises may drive otherwise 
viable firms out of business (Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier 2000; Casacuberta and Gandelman 
2009).
   Firms that manage to survive typically respond to decreased demand, increased uncertainty 
and rising costs of capital, by firing, divesting or disbanding. This may entail a loss of firm-specific 
human capital and lead to a permanent increase in unemployment and/or informality, as displaced 
workers find difficult to go back into formal employment. 
In short, even when substantial sectoral adjustment of output and employment is required, 
policies to offset excess churning, prevent the aggravation of market imperfections, limit scarring 
and prevent irrevocable impacts on human capital formation and firms can yield high payoffs.   
1.2 Safety Ropes or Safety Nets?  
In addition to intertemporal tradeoffs, governments face difficult choices between providing 
protection to the most vulnerable – typically the chronically poor – and supporting those most 
directly affected by the crisis – those who lose their jobs and incomes.  
Evidence from previous crises suggests that those who suffer the largest welfare losses may 
not be the ones who are the most directly affected. Recent financial crises have rapidly spread from 
initially affected sectors, typically urban-based exporters, construction and manufacturing, to other 
parts of the economy, via reduced demand and re-allocation of labor.  Thus even those not 
immediately impacted by a crisis are likely to suffer substantial earnings losses. Increased entry into 
self-employment and subsistence agriculture erodes the profitability of such sectors.  In Indonesia, 
for example, while the construction sector initially bore the brunt of the impact from the 1998 crisis, 
contracting by 37%, by the end of the crisis mean earnings across the economy had declined by an 5 
 
estimated 40%, with falls distributed over the entire income-earning distribution (Manning 2000).  
Similarly, while urban households with workers in financial services and construction suffered the 
greatest income declines (48% and 35% respectively) during Mexico’s 1994/5 peso crisis, rural farm 
workers saw a 17% income reduction (McKenzie 2002). And even in cases where the earnings losses 
suffered by vulnerable groups may not be particularly large in absolute terms, the welfare impact of 
such losses is likely to be severe, since the poor often lack the coping capacity to deal with even 
relatively minor shocks. 
The mechanisms by which labor market adjustment takes place will have an impact on who, 
in turn, shoulders the principal burden of adjustment. In broad terms, labor market adjustment can 
occur through two main channels: (i) via reduction in the number of people employed or in the 
number of hours worked per person (i.e. quantity adjustment); or (ii) via wage declines (i.e. price 
adjustment). Wage adjustment can be accomplished by an across the board reduction in wages – i.e., 
a shift of the wage distribution to the left – or by a change in the composition of employment 
towards less well paid jobs (see Fallon and Lucas 2002).  
If most of the adjustment occurs through generalized wage declines, protecting the most 
vulnerable becomes important. Yet, it may raise political economy problems precisely because the 
most vulnerable may not be the most immediately impacted and because they are not always 
strongly politically represented. By contrast if first-round labor market adjustments are concentrated 
in specific geographic areas or sectors, then targeted interventions to protect those most 
immediately affected may also be needed. 
2. DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE POLICY PACKAGE   
A key question that policymakers have to address when designing the policy responses is 
whether or not the shock is a cyclical downturn that does not require significant changes in the 
current composition of output and employment to get back to rapid and sustainable growth, or 
whether resumption of growth requires significant reallocations of resources across sectors and 
firms. If the latter are required, then the issue of how to balance policies that aim to mitigate short-
term impacts with those that foster the movement of resources out of non-viable sectors and firms 
becomes critical.   
Choosing the wrong policy package to cope with a shock is costly since unsuitable policies 
may intensify the crisis. For example, using countercyclical fiscal stimuli when the crisis is structural 
might undermine countries’ medium-term competitiveness, distort adjustment, and lead to increases 
in public debt, thus potentially leading to large growth losses. Even when fiscal stimuli are 
appropriate, frontloading them may limit fiscal space to cushion the shock over the medium-run.  In 
addition, competitiveness might be undermined by artificial appreciation (or a lack of depreciation) 
of the exchange rate as a result of increased public spending.  
As another example, structural policies implemented to protect workers may stifle recovery 
and undermine employment creation. In Indonesia, the crisis sparked pro-labor pressures that led to 6 
 
better enforcement of minimum wages and the introduction of severance pay and dismissal 
regulations,  leading to more severe rigidities in hiring and firing (Manning 2000). While more 
stringent regulation helped raise earnings and employment stability of manufacturing workers, the 
employment elasticity of manufacturing output growth sharply declined after the crisis-period, 
hampering job creation and the recovery of jobs (Narjoko and Hill 2007; Hill and Shiraishi 2007). 
2.1 Constraints  
When designing policy responses, governments are constrained by: i) their ability to 
anticipate the impact of the crisis and policy responses to the crisis; ii) the available fiscal space; and, 
iii) institutional capacity and political economy conditions. Which policy interventions are feasible 
and yield the highest returns will crucially depend on these initial conditions. In section 4.1, we shall 
argue that prevailing policy regime and the existing social safety net system are also important 
determinants of which policy package is most appropriate. 
Effective evidence-based policy making requires an adequate system for monitoring early 
warning and fast-tracking indicators, to help policymakers identify transmission channels and the 
appropriate policy response. Unfortunately, labor market information systems in developing 
countries are often very weak, thus constraining policymaker’s ability to formulate effective policy 
packages. As a result, decisions are often made against a backdrop of extreme uncertainty, on the 
basis of very partial (and outdated) data: for instance, data may track formal sector wages only, even 
though the vast majority of the workforce is working in the informal sector.  
In times of crisis, government budgets are likely to come under strain. For example, on 
average public debt rose by over 86 percent during the post-war financial crises (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009). Tax revenues are typically procyclical and governments may face borrowing 
constraints.  Thus, unless governments have prepared for crises by accumulating reserves, the scope 
for undertaking additional policy measures is likely to be limited, especially for countries with high 
levels of debt.  
In many cases, the relevant question might be which policies and safety nets to protect, 
rather than what additional policies to undertake. Indeed, spending on safety nets is typically 
procyclical rather than countercyclical (Braun and Di Gresia 2003; De Ferranti and others 2000 – see 
also the discussion in Grosh and others 2008a, p.55).  Often, the best option to finance safety net 
programs during crises times is to pre-fund safety net budgets (Grosh and others 2008a).  Once 
confronted with a crisis, countries can try to reallocate expenditures from less productive programs 
to ones which are more effective. Such budget reallocations can have a positive distributional 
impact, as happened in Jamaica, which eliminated general food subsidies in 1984 and used a share of 
the resulting savings to fund its Food Stamp Program (Grosh and others 2008a, p.56), with a 
positive impact on poverty reduction (Ezemenari and Subbarao 1999). 
Political economy conditions and institutional capacity are two other important determinants 
of governments’ room for maneuver. Some believe that crises may provide a window of opportunity 7 
 
to reform unwieldy institutions and make political decisions that would in ‘normal’ times be 
unfeasible (Robinson, 2009).  This is perhaps best encapsulated by Hillary Clinton’s one-liner: 
“never waste a good crisis.”  For example, for countries lacking sound social safety nets and 
automatic stabilizers, crises can be an opportune time to institute such programs. The experience of 
Mexico in the aftermath of the tequila crisis demonstrated that stabilizers set up under emergency 
conditions can in turn serve as a stepping stone for the development of more permanent income 
support systems (see Marquez 2007; Grosh and others 2008a)  
Whether or not crises indeed catalyze reform is an open empirical question however 
(Robinson 2009; Drazen and Easterly 2001; Drazen 1983). And even if crises trigger reforms, the 
extent to which such reforms will be conducive to long-run growth depends will depend on the 
existing political situation and institutions. Acemoglu and others (2008) show that in societies with 
weak institutions policy reforms may be ineffective because the underlying political economy 
problems are not typically altered by these reforms. Cavallo and Cavallo (2008) demonstrate that 
only countries with strong political competition and external constraints on governments are likely 
to be able to use crises as opportunities to enhance long-run growth.  
2.2 The Need for Coherence and Coordination 
The theory of the second best tells us that when multiple market failures interact, correcting 
one market failure may make things worse not better. In designing policy packages, policymakers 
must pay special attention to the coherence and timing of policy packages. Evidence from Korea 
suggests that the adverse impact of the East Asian crisis was substantially softened by the 
multifaceted policy response undertaken by the Korean government (Phang and Kim 2001; Hur 
2001). Thus policies should be designed as a package of structural interventions rather than as a 
plethora of isolated responses.   
Timing matters too. For example, while introducing reforms conducive to long-run growth, 
the adjustment program implemented in Thailand to cope with the Asian crisis proved to be too 
tight, leading to an unnecessary decline in output (Dollar and Halward-Driemeijer, 2000).  
Moreover, if crises affect multiple countries at the same time, internationally coordinated 
efforts may be required. If individual countries pursue their own self-interest, for example by 
implementing protectionist policies, they may be collectively worse off than when they cooperate. In 
addition, self-insurance is inferior to insurance through international cooperation (Fernandez Arias 
and others 2009).  
3. WHAT WORKS: EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS 
The above discussion makes it clear that it is very difficult to prescribe a uniform policy 
package that will work for all countries. Instead, policies need to be tailored to the characteristics of 
the crisis and country-specific circumstances such as the available fiscal space, the prevailing policy 
regime and political economy conditions. To complicate matters further, there is no consensus on 8 
 
which individual policies are most likely to be effective under alternative scenarios. This is because 
the empirical evidence regarding policies to cope with the labor market impacts of crises is sparse. 
Moreover, the literature points in different directions as the impact of different policy responses has 
been highly heterogeneous and strongly context-dependent. Using evidence from previous crises, 
this section highlights the importance of having effective safety nets and sound structural policies in 
place at the outset of the crisis. Subsequently, it reviews the empirical evidence on the effectiveness 
of commonly used policy responses. We only present our main findings. A more detailed review is 
presented in the appendix.  
3.1 Permanent Policies: Being Prepared Pays Off  
Programs and policies set up prior to crisis are arguably more effective in dealing with 
shocks than policy responses, which are designed “on the run,” difficult to get right, hard to 
implement and possibly difficult to dislodge once they are no longer needed.  Analyzing the efficacy 
of structural policies (defined as policies that have been in place for a prolonged period of time) to 
mitigate the impact of shocks, Collier and Goderis (forthcoming) find that regulations that delay the 
speed of firm closure significantly and substantially increase the short-term growth loss from adverse 
price-shocks in mineral exporting countries, while labor market flexibility helps reduce short-term 
output losses due to natural disasters.  Similarly, Bassanini and others (2009) find that in OECD 
countries, mandatory dismissal regulations have a depressing impact on productivity growth in 
industries where layoff restrictions are more likely to be binding. 
Countries’ ability to cope with shocks increases considerably if appropriate safety nets are in 
place before a crisis hits (Grosh and others 2008, Ferreira and others 1999).  In reviewing the 
performance of safety nets during crises in Latin America and East Asia, Blomquist and others 
(2001) observe that since many safety net programs had to be set up from scratch, spending on 
these programs ended up being procyclical rather than countercyclical. They argue that permanent 
safety nets can provide much more effective protection than ad hoc policies.  The usefulness of 
permanent, countercyclical safety net spending is also illustrated by Ravallion and Lokshin’s (2000) 
analysis of the performance of the Russian social safety net during the 1998 crisis; while the safety 
net fell short of fully protecting living standards, it helped provide protection against poverty.  In 
times of crisis, expanding existing programs is likely to be a more effective strategy to cope with 
shocks than implementing new and untested programs from scratch (World Bank, 2008).   
3.2  Policy Responses  
In practice, though, many countries will not be optimally prepared for crisis times. Such 
countries cannot rely on automatic stabilizers but will instead have to undertake policy responses to 
mitigate the adverse impacts of a crisis.  
This section takes stock of prominent policy responses. We categorize these policies into: i) 
policies to support employment, in particular, wage subsidies, access to credit and reduced hours 
arrangements; ii) policies to facilitate transitions, including training, job-search assistance and self-9 
 
employment assistance programs; and, iii) policies to protect losers, namely, unemployment benefits,  
public works programs and cash transfers. This is certainly not intended as a rigid categorization, as 
many policies can serve multiple goals.  For example, facilitating access to credit not only supports 
existing jobs, but can also create opportunities for losers.  As another example, wage subsidies can 
both be used to support employment opportunities and to compensate earnings shortfalls.  
Previewing our results, two findings are worth highlighting. First, while estimates of 
effectiveness are heterogeneous (suggesting that context and design matter) they are limited on 
average. This supports the argument that having permanent policies and sound safety net systems in 
place is superior to haphazardly implementing policies after a crisis hits. However, if countries are 
not prepared for crisis, the necessary speed and scale of policy responses may require compromises 
in terms of targeting and design (Grosh and others 2008a). In other words, programs with a 
mediocre design that are implemented quickly may yield better protection than well-designed 
programs that take time to implement, albeit at some cost in terms of leakages. 
Second, a common finding is that the effectiveness of policy responses is enhanced if they 
are implemented in conjunction with other policies, thus providing empirical support for the 
argument that policies are likely to be more effective when they are part of a comprehensive policy 
package than when they are implemented in isolation. 
3.2.1  Policies to Support Employment 
Facilitating access to credit  
Facilitating access to credit, for example by expanding microfinance and facilitating  access 
to trade finance, can prevent otherwise viable firms from going out of business due to cash-flow 
problems, although governments must of course be careful not to bail out firms that are not viable 
or encourage moral hazard.  
A review of the studies evaluating the performance of microcredit schemes during previous 
crises, summarized in Table 1 in the appendix, shows that they have performed relatively well. While 
many large banks suffered major problems, microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Indonesia were 
remarkably resilient to the East Asian crisis (Patten and others, 2001). In Bolivia, the Caja Los Andes 
bank’s microfinance branch was not significantly impacted by the 1998 crisis, unlike other branches 
of the same bank. However, Marconi and others (2006) contend that the performance of the 
microcredit branch was a positive outlier – and point out that other Bolivian banks and 
microfinance institutions were forced to reduce their lending. They argue that the procyclical nature 
of MFI lending might in fact have exacerbated the crisis. Furthermore, the ability of microfinance 
credit schemes to alleviate crises may by hampered by credit market interventions. During the East 
Asian crisis, rural MFIs were adversely affected by governments’ reluctance to extend rural credit 
guarantees (Patten and others 2001, McGuire and Conroy 1998). In addition, short-term fixes such 
as such as loan forgiveness, subsidized lending, or interest caps may negatively affect long-term 
access to financial services (Littlefield 2009). The evidence, summarized in Table 1 in the appendix, 10 
 
points to the importance of careful design of credit extension schemes; in facilitating sustainable 
access to credit, the devil is in the details.    
Temporary payroll tax holidays and wage subsidies  
Subsidies have been widely applied during previous crises. The theoretical appeal of this 
intervention is indeed clear (see for example Pauw and Edwards 2006). They limit short-term labor 
retrenchment and can, in principle, be targeted to maximize protection for the most vulnerable 
groups, such as women and young workers.  
However, the available evidence on their impact (summarized in Table 2) suggests that such 
schemes typically have high deadweight and substitution effects both during crises (in the order of 
magnitude of 20%) and during less volatile times. Their effectiveness also seems limited although it 
varies with sector and firm-size (Abrahart and others 2000). They have been found to be less 
effective in highly capital intensive sectors and more effective when targeted at small firms, perhaps 
because these firms pay lower wages (Kang and others 2001). Their impact may be (marginally) 
enhanced if they are combined with job search assistance (Betcherman and others 2004), 
underscoring the importance of implementing comprehensive policy responses.  In the medium to 
long term, however, subsidies are unlikely to be economically or politically sustainable.  
Temporary reduction in hours worked 
 Another popular option to maintain viable employment is to facilitate reduced hours 
arrangements, such as publicly financed trainings, access to partial unemployment benefits, and paid 
holidays.  For example, a recent ILO survey of 54 countries (10 LICs, 10 lower middle income, 17 
upper middle income and 17 HICs) shows that reductions in hours worked have been implemented 
in a number countries including China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, 
Columbia and Jordan (ILO, 2009). 
3.2.2 Policies to Facilitate Transitions 
The same ILO survey shows that 63% of countries had introduced additional training 
measures in response to the recent financial crisis, 78% had implemented subsidies and tax 
reductions for SMEs, and nearly 50% had increased capacity for public employment services. All of 
these percentages are much higher if Sub-Saharan Africa is excluded from the sample.  
Training, self-employment assistance and job-search assistance facilitate employment 
transitions. Evaluations of such programs during less volatile economic times suggest that their 
impacts are highly heterogeneous and strongly dependent on context and implementation (Auer 
2008).  In a meta-analysis of active labor market programs, Card and Weber (2009) demonstrate that 
many programs that exhibit insignificant or even negative impacts after only a year have significantly 
positive impacts after 2 or 3 years, indicating that the impacts may vary with time.   11 
 
  Training programs can help enhance the productivity of labor and may be used to help 
workers adapt to a changing economic environment. Since human capital formation is a cumulative 
process, training benefits the most able workers foremost, making it a weak tool for protecting the 
most vulnerable. Training seems to be most effective when used in conjunction with other policies 
(Fares and Puerto, 2008) – providing further evidence for the contention that comprehensive policy 
packages are likely to be more effective than policies implemented in isolation.   
While they have been utilized in a variety of forms during past crises, the fragmented 
evidence reviewed in Table 3 in the appendix suggests that, on average, the usefulness of training 
programs is limited. The net employment effect of training policies implemented in response to 
crises is in the range of 10% to 20% (See Table 4).   
Self-employment assistance programs usually have high deadweight and displacement 
effects and only help a selected subset of the vulnerable population.  During “normal” times, 
businesses created under self-employment policies have high failure rates, often exceeding 50% (see 
Abrahart and others 2000).  Evidence exists of positive impacts for older and better-educated 
workers, but take-up is highly concentrated amongst individuals with entrepreneurial skills, many of 
whom would have started up their own enterprise regardless of the introduction of self-employment 
support (Betcherman and others 2004; Abrahart and others 2000).  For instance, Almeida and 
Galasso (2007) find that only a very small subset of former welfare beneficiaries – those who were 
younger, more educated, and with previous self-employment experience – were attracted to a self-
employment assistance program in Argentina. Subsidies for self-employment initiatives normally 
reach less than 5 percent of the unemployed but are somewhat more promising when targeted at 
particular groups – such as women and older individuals (Auer 2008; Abrahart and others 2000).  
Implementation of self-employment support may also entail a tradeoff between promoting the 
creation of new firms and protecting the profitability of incumbent firms (Auer 2008).     
Job-search assistance services such as counseling, placement assistance and job matching 
typically have positive impacts on post-program employment and earnings and favorable cost-
benefit ratios in developed countries. However, it is not clear how they perform in developing 
countries, where many labor market transactions are informal, and in times of crisis, when the 
demand for labor is lower than usual.   
3.2.3 Policies to Protect Losers 
Unemployment Benefits 
According to the ILO survey 32% of countries have adopted some extension of 
unemployment benefits in response to the current financial crisis and 28% have used partial 
unemployment benefits to cover reduced hours and part-time training (ILO, 2009).  
When the labor market transmission of shocks occurs primarily via a reduction in formal 
sector employment and an effective unemployment insurance system is in place, unemployment 12 
 
benefits can act as an automatic stabilizer, effectively compensating those who lose their jobs.  In 
times of crisis, an extension of the duration of the entitlement may be appropriate.  Coverage can 
also be extended to previously unprotected groups, such as workers with short employment 
histories, those completing prolonged training courses, those exiting from public works, or, as was 
the case in Korea during the Asian financial crisis, to workers in small enterprises. The introduction 
of unemployment benefits targeted to low skilled workers and those on low wages may also be an 
option in middle income countries with good administrative capacity.   
Unemployment benefits can also be used to compensate workers for a reduction in the 
number of work hours, with a view to allowing employers to maintain workers in times of weak 
demand. Typically, workers who reduce their work hours receive unemployment insurance benefits 
pro-rated for the hours lost, benefit duration is limited to 20–30 weeks, and there is a floor (and 
sometimes, a ceiling) for the percentage of the workforce that reduces work hours (Abraham and 
Houseman 1993).   
An effective system of unemployment insurance requires time and substantial institutional 
(and fiscal) capacity to implement, monitor, and target benefits (Vodopivec 2006).  Only a small 
number of developing countries have a comprehensive and effective system of unemployment 
benefits in place and in some of them, such as Chile and Columbia, the benefits are anchored to 
individuals’ savings accounts. For MICs, an innovative proposal has been suggested as a rapid 
response to the current crisis (Robalino and others forthcoming). This involves the introduction of a 
variant of the standard unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) that allows for 
borrowing from these accounts, using pension wealth as a guarantee. By relying on past social 
security contributions as a qualifying condition, such a scheme could be made operational in a 
relative short time (4-6 months) and eventually it could be transformed to a permanent scheme by 
mandating regular (worker and employer) contributions.  
Nevertheless, for many developing countries unemployment benefits are not a viable 
instrument to protect the losers and stabilize the economy. For such countries public works 
programs may represent a better option.  
Public works programs   
Public work programs are a common feature of crisis response packages, especially in 
countries without an effective unemployment insurance program. They have been used with this 
purpose in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Peru (Grosh 
and others 2008a) and they appear to be the most common response to the current financial crisis so 
far (ILO, 2009). The existing empirical evidence on the impact of expanding public works programs 
to mitigate crisis impacts provides scope for modest optimism regarding their possible capacity to 
absorb excess labor. For example, the Argentinian Jefes Y Jefes program – introduced during the 
Argentine crisis to provide support to unemployed household heads conditional on a work 
requirement – helped reduce unemployment by 2.5% and could have been even more effective if 13 
 
better targeted (Ravallion and Galasso, 2005). Yet, when labor market adjustments to shocks occur 
primarily via wages, public work programs will be less useful as a crisis response.   
The limited available evidence also suggests that self-selection into public works programs 
provides a fairly efficient instrument for targeting those most impacted by a crisis. Self-targeting 
through a low-wage, assures that leakages tend to benefit the poor and assures a credible exit 
strategy.   
The cost-effectiveness of public works programs depends on budget leverage, labor intensity 
of the program, targeting performance, the net wage gain of participants receive, as well as possible 
indirect benefits. Ravallion (1999) estimates that the cost of a $1 gain in current earnings to the poor 
using the public employment programs is about $5 in a middle income country and $3.50 for the 
middle and low-income countries respectively.  While the cost-effectiveness of public work 
programs may be better than that of other transfer mechanisms, it is likely to be inferior to that of 
direct transfer programs. 
Cash Transfers  
Although they are not specific labor market interventions, cash transfers can be an effective 
method to compensate losers when the adjustments occur primarily via wage reductions.  Provided 
that they have adequate coverage and generosity, they have also been found to be very cost-effective 
options for protecting the most vulnerable, especially in LICs, as they have low administrative costs 
and do not distort prices. In-kind transfers are less desirable in general, because they have higher 
administrative costs and are more paternalistic. “Near-cash” instruments (e.g. food stamps) 
represent a middle ground, but their administrative costs tend also to be significantly higher than 
cash transfers.  
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs may improve on the performance of unconditional 
cash transfers in channeling help to the most vulnerable.  For example, they may be targeted at 
children and women, who often bear the brunt of economic crises.  Conditioning cash transfers on 
school enrolment may enhance children’s educational outcomes, and conditioning on female labor 
market participation may boost women’s intrahousehold bargaining position. Thus, in countries 
where CCTs are already established, raising benefits or expanding coverage could be desirable.  For 
example, evidence from Mexico’s Oportunidades and Indonesia’s scholarship program Jaring 
Pengamanan Sosial shows CCTs can protect poor children’s school enrollment against shocks (de 
Janry and others 2006; Cameron 2002).  However, where cash transfer programs are not in place, as 
in many LICs, conditional transfer schemes are likely to take longer to implement than 
unconditional schemes. Conditionality must also be carefully assessed, since poorly designed 
schemes may actually exclude the most vulnerable, such as those who do not have access to the 
public services upon which transfers are conditioned.  As a crisis response, targeted unconditional 
cash transfers may therefore yield better results. 14 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS: PREPARE AND PRESERVE POLICIES THAT WORK 
The deep economic shocks experienced by developing countries over the last two years 
remind us that crises are a recurring phenomenon.  Macroeconomic shocks can have deep and long-
lasting effects on labor market structures and outcomes, which in turn may undermine the prospects 
for recovery, future growth and poverty reduction.  Crises thus confront governments with the need 
to act promptly and effectively to protect employment and labor earnings and to compensate the 
losers. The pressure is particularly profound in developing countries, where the incidence of poverty 
and vulnerability is high, safety net systems are weak and the poor own no other assets than labor. 
This paper examines the challenges faced by policymakers of developing countries in 
identifying the interventions that can transform crises from threats to development to catalysts for 
institutional reform conducive to growth and poverty reduction. It focuses on two important 
tradeoffs: (i) between offsetting adverse short-term impacts and preserving incentives for economic 
recovery and future growth; and, (ii) between protecting the most vulnerable and compensating 
those most immediately impacted. It also highlights how policymakers’ room for maneuver is limited 
during crises by deteriorating fiscal space, limited institutional capacity and mounting political 
economy pressures. It points out how these constraints are particularly stringent in developing 
countries, where the scope for fiscal stimuli and incremental interventions is often nonexistent, and 
timely and reliable information on the evolution of labor market outcomes is rarely available. In 
many of these countries the relevant question is not what additional policies to undertake, but rather 
what policies to protect.  
Using empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such policies during past crises, this paper 
claims that taking a myopic and reactive approach to crises may not only be costly, it may also be 
counterproductive.  Implementing the wrong policies, or doing so at the wrong time, might 
exacerbate, rather than attenuate, the depth and length of the downturn. If resumption of growth 
requires substantial reallocation of employment and output, policy responses such as wage subsidies 
might obstruct recovery by hampering adjustment in the long run, even if these responses may help 
minimize excess churning and limit scarring effects in the short run.  
Instead of focusing on isolated responses, this paper advocates taking a more comprehensive 
approach, by building institutions that can deliver a coordinated and coherent policy package 
conducive to long-run growth. Such institutions will not only help mitigate the impact of the 
contemporary crisis, but will also help dampen and shorten future crises and maximize growth 
prospects. Implementing sound structural policies ex-ante is a more effective crisis coping strategy 
than scrambling for responses once the crisis has hit. Countries with prudent fiscal management, 
reliable labor market information systems, labor market policies promoting flexibility, well-
functioning credit markets, and sound safety net systems have proven much better at cushioning 
shocks; safety nets such as public works programs offer protection for the chronically poor, while 
direct transfers can be help to protect those most immediately impacted.  15 
 
On the other hand, a pressing need for additional policies to cope with the current crisis 
indicates that pre-existing institutions were insufficient to cope with the shock. For countries in need 
of such additional policies, the crisis can provide an opportune time to institute automatic stabilizers 
and set up safety nets, which can serve as a stepping stone for the development of more permanent 
income support systems. However, this task may be especially daunting in countries that have poor 
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Appendix A: Review of Evidence on Main Policy Interventions 
Table 1: Wage subsidies/Payroll tax subsidies 






Phang et al. 
(2001). 
Annual Economically Active Population Survey,
(1995-2000) from the National Statistical 
Office are used in combination with statistics 
provided by the Ministry of Labor and Korea 
Labor Institute.   
Net employment effect calculated as:  
net employment effect = gross effect – 
deadweight  loss – substitution effect – 
displacement effect. 
Net employment effect of the employment 
stabilization program1 was 22.5% on 
average, implying a high deadweight loss.   
The effectiveness of wage subsides varied 
with firm-size as well as sector. More 
capital intensive sectors benefitted less 
while small firms benefitted more. 
Czech Republic and 
Hungary (1990-2005) 
Wage subsidies to help the 
long-term unemployed 
Fretwell, and 
others (1999)  
Matching in combination with regression 
methods. 
Employment impact was an increase of  10 
pp in Czech Republic*** and 12 pp in 
Hungary**. 
 
OECD and Post-Soviet 
transition countries (1982-
1999) 
Mix of wage subsidies studied. 
Dar and 
others (1999) 
Literature review: An analysis of 18 
interventions in developed and developing 
countries: 1 experimental, 11 quasi-
experimental, and 6 non-scientific. 
  Additionality is typically in the order 
of magnitude of 20-35% 
  Deadweight effects range between 20-
70% 




Note: ** Impact statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence 
          *** Impact statistically significant at the 99 percent level of confidence 21 
 
Table 2: Access to Credit 
Crisis and Context   Authors  Methodology Main Findings Comments
Indonesia (1997) 
Performance of different parts 
of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI 




others. (2001)  
 
(Descriptive) Comparative analysis of the 
performance of different parts of BRI during 
crisis including corporate banking, retail 
banking and micro-banking. 
 
Microenterprise credit remarkably resilient 
to the crisis and outperformed other parts 
of RBI. 
  Microcredit repayment rates>97%  
  Average growth of microfinance 
lending=14% p.a. (1997-1999) 
  Ratio of savings accounts to loan 
accounts = 1 to 1 (1997-1999) 
Bolivia (1998) 
Crisis performance of Caja Los 
Andes, a registered savings and 
loan company using 





Bivariate probit model of i) defaults and ii) late 
repayment, correcting for selection due to no-
random characteristics of individuals with loan 
approval . Exclusion restrictions: (i)  for first-
time loans= the amount requested; (ii)  for 
prior loans = the length of prior loan  
Sample: 76,000 clients and 28,000 rejected loan 
applications (May 1992-June 2000).   
The crisis had a negative, but insignificant 
impact on the probability of repayment 
 
 
According to Marconi et al. (2006) the 
performance of Caja Los Andes was a 
“positive outlier”. Most banks and 
financial intermediaries witnessed 
higher arrears and lower the value of 
outstanding loans. Unfortunately, they 
only present descriptive statistics 
making it  difficult to assess causality.  
Bolivia (1998-2004) 
Comparative analysis of 
microfinance institutions 
 
Marconi et al. 
(2006) 
(Descriptive) Comparative analysis of banks 
and microfinance institutions + simulation 
exercise. Focus on the value of the outstanding 
portfolio and arrears rates Simulation based on 
a structural macro-model that endogenizes the 
microcredit sector calibrated by means of OLS 
regressions estimated using a sample of 48 
observations drawn from 8 microfinance 
institutions (1997-2002) and parameter values 
inferred from existing literature. 
While banks and microfinance institutions 
reduced their lending and witnessed 
increasing arrears institutions providing 
savings, training and quasi-insurance did 
relatively well.   
Simulation suggests: (i)  microfinance 
institutions acted as a crisis catalyst; (ii) 
improvements in the design of microcredit 
schemes (such as the introduction of 
complementary insurance and savings 
schemes) enhance the effectiveness of 
microcredit institutions  
The paper presents many useful 
descriptive statistics. The simulation 
relies on strong structural assumptions.  
In addition, the econometric analysis at 
the basis of the  model calibration 





Table 3: Training and Self-Employment assistance 
Crisis and Context   Authors Methodology Main Findings Comments
Korea (date crisis began Oct 
2007)  
Training programs for the  
unemployed. 
Kang and 
others (2001)  
(Descriptive) Comparison of  participants and 
non-participants to determine effect of training 
on the unemployed + hazard model. 
Re-employment Rate:  No significant differences between 
the two groups:  49.6% of participants v/s 53% of non-
participants have been re-employed and 38% of 
participants v/s 40% of non-participants were employed at 
time of study.   
  Performance after active job search: Training 
participants were more successful in finding jobs: one-
third was re-employed within  a month and  54.3% 
within the first three months and 23.4% found re-
employment after seven months (compared to rates of 
, 21% s and 60% for non participants). 
  Participants spent on average 4.3 months before re-
employment compared to an average of 8.6 months 
for the rest.  
  However a higher percentage of participants held full-
time  wage employment  compared to non-
participants, while a larger percentage of non-
participants held part-time jobs. 
  However, participation in training increases the 
probability of re-employment by 28% and the impact 
was particularly significant for women, training 
participation increases the probability of re-
employment ( 63% higher ). 
China  (1998-2000) 
Retraining programs for laid-off 
workers in the cities of 
Shenyang and Wuhan.    
 
Bidani et al. 
(2005) 
Propensity score matching in conjunction with 
regression methods. 
 
The training and comparison group was 
chosen from official 1998 census data.  The 
final sample was administered in 2000. 
  Positive impact on employment in Wuhan. Little 
impact  in Shenyang but impact on earnings was 
reversed 
  Participation higher for unemployed younger females, 
previously working in non-state owned manufacturing  
who have visited an employment service center in the 
past  (indicating targeting was effective).  
Argentina (1994) 
Programa Joven.   
 
Aedo et al. 
(2001) 
Data for individuals who registered and 
qualified for training programs (March 1996 – 
December 1997). 
 Propensity Scores Matching Estimators and 
Cost benefit analysis. 
  Impact on earnings statistically significant but only for 
young males and adult females. 
  Impact on employment only statistically significant for 
adult females. 
  Statistically significant impacts not sensitive to 
different specification ( propensity score matching) but 
cost-benefit analysis indicates it takes 9 years for the 
net present value to become positive. 23 
 
  For all of the beneficiaries 12 years are required for the 
program to have a positive net present value. 
Argentina (1994) 
 





Difference-in-difference methodology to 
compare the outcomes of interest for project 
participants before and after the intervention 
with those of non-participants.  A baseline 
household survey was administered to 309 
participants and 244 non-participants. 
  Those with entrepreneurial skills, female household 
heads and more educated individuals are most likely to 
take up self-employment. 
  No evidence of average income gains to participants 
and their households in the short run. 
Mexico (1982) 
PROBECAT (Programa de 









Use the PROBECAT at the state level is used 
as an instrumental variable to control for 
endogenity of program placement to compare 
a sample of PROBECAT participants and a 
sample of unemployed individuals from 
Mexico’s urban employment survey. 
Heckman Sample Selection Model is used to 
estimate the impact of PROBECAT on 
monthly earnings corrected for selection into 
the program. Cox Proportional Hazard Models 
are estimated to assess the impact of training 
on the time necessary to find employment. 
  No impact on employment and wages found.  
 
This result contrasts 
with earlier 
evaluations; this study 
concludes that the 
positive results in the 
past evaluations were 
obtained because 
limited attention was 
given to the problem 
of sample selection. 
Mexico(1984) 
PROBECAT (Programa de 





Comparison Group Analysis with quarterly 
National Urban Employment Surveyy 
administered to the 1990 cohort of 
PROBECAT participants with the non-
participants comprised of unemployed 
individuals  
Heckman Two Stage Selectivity Correction 
Proceudure is used to correct for selectivity 
into the program. Cox Proportional Hazards 
Model of unemployment duration on the 
pooled trainee and comparison group samples. 
  PROBECAT fairly effective in shortening the duration 
of unemployment only for trainees with prior work 
experience. 
  It also improved the likelihood of employment over a 
longer run  
(three-six months for male and one year for female) 
  It raised post-training earnings of men but not women 
and the effects were greater for males with 7-9 years of 
schooling. 
  For both men and women, training induced an 
increase in the number of hours worked per week. 
  The study confirms that program evaluation results can 
be sensitive to the way in which training effects are 
measured.  A key source of bias is that arising from 
nonrandom selection of participants into the training 




Table 4: Public Works 
Crisis and Context   Authors  Methodology Main Findings Comments
Argentina (1994-2003) 
 




Matched subset of applicants who are not yet 
accepted into the program are used as a 
comparison for program participants using 
matching methods to control for selection on 
observables. Matches double differenced estimates 
of program impact are used to minimize bias due 
to selection on unobservable but estimates are 
imprecise, rendering the matched single-
differenced estimates the preferred estimation 
method.  
  Program reduced unemployment by 2.5% and had 
a small impact on poverty rate, but a large impact 
on the number of people in extreme poverty which 
would have been 10% without the program. 
  The impact could have been higher if the program 
had been targeted since the program attracted many 
inactive people into the workforce. 
 
Argentina (1994-2003) 
Jefas Y Jefas programme, 
Iturriza, A. 
and Bedi, A 
and Sparrow, 
R (2008) 
Comparison of probability of exiting 
unemployment of participants and non-
participants using logit and multinomial logit 
models, single-differenced and double-differenced 
matcing estimators 
  Participation is associated with a 12-19% lower 
probability of transiting to employment  
  Women are especially less likely to exit the 
program. 
Indonesia (1997-2000) 
Two social safety net programs: 
the Jaring Pengaman Sosial) and a 




Dynamic benefit incidence analysis using 
representative household panel data. 
  The job creation program was much better at 
targeting the most affected than the rice subsidy 
program, 








* Poverty Reduction Group, The World Bank, Washington DC, USA. 
i It should be noted that the empirical evidence for the idea that crises catalyze the process of creative destruction is more ambiguous than theory would 
suggest. Studies of manufacturing firms only weakly support the hypothesis that allocative efficiency increases during downturns (see, for example, 
Griliches and Regev 1995; Bailey and others 1998; Foster and others 2001). 